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w, Te live in an age where informa-
tion is critical. Households and busi-
nesses invest considerable amounts of
time and other resources monitoring eco-
nomic and business developments.
These market participants incorporate
their expectations of the future into their
decisions. Expectations, based on accu-
mulated information, are used to help re-
sources find their highest financial rate
of return.
People work hard to form correct and
unbiased opinions about future events,
including government policies.
"Fedwatching" is a good example. The
value-added by Fedwatchers shows up
in market expectations about the direc-
tion of Federal Open Market Commit-
tee (FOMC) policies, affecting finan-
cial contracts and spending and saving
decisions throughout the economy.
Uncertainty and mistaken expectations
reduce the quality of those decisions
and our economic well-being.
How much, when, and what kind of
monetary policy information the FOMC
should release has been a controversial
issue for some time. The conventional
approach to these questions addresses
them in the context of our existing pol-
icy environment. My goal is to contrast
this conventional approach with an alter-
native one, by asking what information
the FOMC would want to release and
Fedwatchers would want to receive in
an "ideal" monetary policy environ-
ment. I believe that the opportunities for
improving information about policy are
greater from clarifying the goals of pol-
icy than from greater and more timely
information about the present policy
process.
An ideal monetary policy is simply a
credible and predictable commitment to
an appropriate long-term policy goal. I
have spent considerable time recently
explaining why long-term price stability
is the optimal goal of monetary policy.
By aiming at that goal, monetary policy
can make its greatest contribution to
long-term real growth and stability of
the economy. Setting a goal of price sta-
bility and committing to a timetable for
achieving that goal will reduce market
uncertainty and allow markets to allo-
cate resources more productively, today
and in the future.
• Policy Information in the
Current Setting
Despite the progress we have made
since the 1970s, inflation has not been
eliminated, and many observers can le-
gitimately question our commitment to
eliminate it. Three decades ago,
inflation uncertainty five years out was
probably confined to a range of 0 to 3
percent. Today that range is obviously
wider, perhaps 0 to 7 percent.
Markets have become more integrated
and efficient in, processing information.
Information is probably no more impor-
tant today than in the past, but it cer-
tainly is more readily available and pro-
cessed more efficiently. This has
changed the short-run policy trade-off
faced by the Federal Reserve. We have
less opportunity to buy excess output
Lack of credibility and predictability
in the monetary policy process can re-
sult from a perception of vagueness
about the ultimate objectives of policy
and the steps that will be taken to cor-
rect deviations from economic goals.
Rather than providing more informa-
tion about the current policy process,
the Federal Reserve could improve
the performance of the economy by
committing to the long-term goal of
price stability and by announcing a
time frame within which to achieve it.
and employment before the inflation-
ary consequences are incorporated into
prices and long-term interest rates.
Monetary policy information comes in
two forms: policy actions and policy
intentions. Policy actions refer to
changes in open market operations.
The FOMC describes these actions as
decisions to maintain or change the de-
gree of reserve pressure, a characteriza-
tion that at present is generally interpre-
ted in terms of its effect on the level of
the federal funds rate.4
Policy intentions, sometimes called the
"policy reaction function," refer to po-
tential future policy actions in response
to evolving economic and financial con-
ditions. Knowledge of policy intentions
helps rational agents plan and carry out
their market activities with minimum
losses due to surprises.
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to characterize because the FOMC has
discretion in formulating policy within
the scope of its multiple objectives.
The Federal Reserve Act of 1913, the
Employment Act of 1946, and the Hum-
phrey-Hawkins Act of 1978 all suggest
objectives that might guide FOMC man-
agement of monetary policy over vari-
ous time horizons.
5 High employment,
maximum growth in output, balance-of-
payments equilibrium, exchange rate
stability, and price stability are all cited
as relevant objectives.
The FOMC's semiannual Humphrey-
Hawkins report to Congress provides in-
formation about policy intentions for
money and credit growth within a 12-
to 18-month horizon. The official Com-
mittee position—the only one on which
an explicit vote is taken and recorded—
is a set of growth ranges, currently for
the M2 and M3 monetary aggregates,
and for debt.
6 The report also states
the central tendency of FOMC
members' expectations about perfor-
mance of the economy over the next
year or more, although it specifies nei-
ther the policy assumptions required to
produce these outcomes, nor the policy
reactions to be implemented should
these outcomes not come to pass.
The domestic policy directive voted on
at each FOMC meeting represents a
combination of an immediate policy ac-
tion and a statement of intention about
how policy should be implemented
through open market operations until
the next meeting. Typically, the opera-
tive sentences in the directive communi-
cate the Committee's decision without
stating an explicit funds-rate objective.
However, both the direction and the
amount of a change become known
almost immediately by the nature of
open market operations at the trading
desk as interpreted by financial analysts.
At one time, the FOMC quantified its
short-run policy intentions in terms of
target paths for money: it would raise
or lower the federal funds rate as
weekly and monthly money numbers
rose or fell relative to the target path.
Vestiges of monetary targeting still re-
main in the expected short-run growth
rates for M2 and M3, and in a 400-
basis-point range outside of which the
funds rate would have to trade in order
to trigger another meeting. At present,
however, neither the short-run money
growth rates nor the federal funds rate
specifications convey much informa-
tion about FOMC intentions, as can be
seen in the obvious indifference of the
money market to the weekly money
supply announcements now, as com-
pared to 10 or 15 years ago.
FOMC intentions now are captured by
the "mights" and "woulds" found in
the second sentence of the directive.
To quote the intention in October 1989,
Taking account of progress toward
price stability, the strength of the
business expansion, the behavior of
the monetary aggregates, and devel-
opments in foreign exchange and
domestic financial markets, slightly
greater reserve restraint might or
slightly lesser reserve restraint
would be acceptable in the inter-
meeting period.
What information is contained in such
a statement? Knowing the "mights"
and "woulds" may at least suggest the
Committee's predisposition toward rais-
ing or lowering the federal funds rate
before the next meeting. But how use-
ful is that statement? None of the con-
tingencies is defined in terms of an
available measure of conditions in the
various sectors of the economy. Nor
are the relative intensities of concern
for all of the sectors indicated, so it is
difficult to predict how the Committee
will respond to mixed signals in the
short run. Nonetheless, in the current
setting, this statement suggests the
likely direction of the next policy ac-
tion, given the state of affairs sug-
gested by the emerging internal and ex-
ternal view of the economy.
• Why Is the Committee So Vague
About Its Intentions?
Vague statements of policy intentions
are nothing new. Except for the period
when the FOMC pegged minimum se-
curities prices during and after World
War II, and except for the brief period
of explicit Ml targeting that ended in
late 1982, the FOMC always has been
vague about its intentions. The typical,
but incorrect, explanation for this
vagueness is that it confirms a funda-
mental theory of bureaucratic behavior:
if you can hide your intentions, then no
one can evaluate your actions.
The correct explanation, I think, is more
fundamental: even though each individ-
ual FOMC member may have policy
intentions, the FOMC as an official body
has not specified either its ultimate objec-
tives or its intended reaction to new
information. And, in the context of multi-
ple goals, it is not always clear in ad-
vance how the Committee will respond
to new information about the economy,
or how the Committee will decide how
fast or slow policy should move to cor-
rect deviations from those goals.
A rotating committee of 12 people pur-
suing multiple objectives surely would
be expected to have difficulty trying to
reach agreement both on a single, un-
ambiguous policy intention and on a
policy action consistent with that inten-
tion. Reaching agreement at each meet-
ing has been the official ground on
which the 12 FOMC members have
reconciled their individual longer-run
intentions until the next meeting.
• Improving the Policy Process
An ideal monetary policy would pro-
duce a credible, predictable commit-
ment to stabilizing the price level. Infla-
tion wastes resources, and uncertainty
about the future rate of inflation wastes
even more resources. It is by avoiding
such waste that monetary policy
strengthens real growth and stability of
the economy.
The lack of credibility and predictabil-
ity of the policy process is the problem.
The more credible the commitment to
the policy goal, the fewer wrong deci-
sions will be made by the markets. The
more predictable the policy reaction to
unforeseen economic events, the more
limited will be the market reaction to
those events. Yet, with the disintegra-
tion of the monetary aggregates as inter-
mediate policy guides, discretionarymonetary policy actions may seem espe-
cially hard to predict because policy ob-
jectives are unclear. The existing policy
process, with its focus on immediate
policy action, does not provide clear ob-
jectives or credibility.
How could we change the process to re-
inforce the credibility of a consistent
goal? I think the most secure way would
be to give the FOMC a legislative man-
date to meet a consistent, attainable, and
unchanging economic goal. Passage of
House Joint Resolution 409, introduced
in September 1989 by Congressman Ste-
phen Neal (D-N.C.) would provide that
crucial reinforcement.
The Neal Resolution simply directs the
Federal Reserve to make price stability
the primary goal of monetary policy.
History gives us little basis for expect-
ing price stability or even a stable rate
of inflation to prevail because the
FOMC has had no mandate to produce
that result. Giving the FOMC that man-
date—knowing that the intention was
to stabilize the inflation rate at zero—
would provide one gigantic piece of
policy information. The System would
remain independent; it would retain
complete discretion about how to carry
out policy. The only change is that Con-
gress would provide more direction
about basic policy objectives.
The Neal Resolution would make the
Federal Reserve's legislated jurisdiction
more like that of West Germany's Bun-
desbank, which is also independent.
More than one goal is specified by law
for the Bundesbank, but West German
law states that the goal of price stability
is to be given highest priority whenever
another goal might conflict with it. This
legislated priority is one reason that
West Germany's inflation experience
has been more favorable than our own.
The FOMC could deliver lower infla-
tion as well. Inflation is a monetary
phenomenon, and the FOMC is the
sole custodian of the quantity of money
in the United States. Short-term devia-
tions from zero inflation may occur,
but, one way or another, the FOMC
can provide a stable price environment.
An alternative to legislation is simply
for the FOMC to adopt the price stabil-
ity goal. As many scholars have urged,
the FOMC might impose a "rule" on it-
self, tying policy actions to some inter-
mediate target variable by an agreed-
upon formula that should assure
achieving price stability. The most pop-
ular candidates for an intermediate pol-
icy target seem to be nominal GNP and
M2, either of which is thought capable
of producing reasonable price stability.
Another approach would be for the
Committee to specify that achieving
the ultimate policy goal is the rule,
using discretion in choosing actions to
achieve the goal.
Of course, having today's FOMC adopt
an explicit rule tying an instrument to a
goal is not a foolproof way to assure
achieving an official policy goal. Cred-
ibility would have to be earned through
predictable actions consistent with the
goal. To adopt an explicit rule, at least a
majority of today's FOMC members
not only must agree on an overriding
macroeconomic goal, but also must re-
nounce some discretion to pursue other
goals. Moreover, tomorrow's FOMC
could decide to change the goal and
hence the rule. In the current policy re-
gime, there is no way that today's pol-
icy choice can bind tomorrow's. Unless
directed by society through specific
mandate, tomorrow's FOMC always
has the discretion to change the goal.
• Credibility and Policy
Information
The ideal policy would improve the
performance of the economy by achiev-
ing price stability with a credible and
predictable policy. The ideal informa-
tion to accompany that policy requires
a credible statement of the goal, prefer-
ably reinforced by a legislative man-
date such as the Neal Resolution, a
time frame in which the goal will be
achieved, and explanations of policy
changes if they occur.
One major benefit of imposing an
explicit intention on monetary policy is
that policy actions in the money market
would become far less momentous than
they now are. Currently, detecting a
change in the federal funds rate target
from the pattern of open market opera-
tions is a crucial activity because it pro-
vides markets with one of the few clues
as to where policy is evolving. Canvass-
ing the positions of individual FOMC
members is a way of predicting future
policy. Policy actions, when detected,
then provide a test of those predictions
of the direction in which policy is evolv-
ing. However, if policy intent were ex-
plicit and credible, finding the clues in
open market operations would have less
significance.
Unfortunately, talking about the Neal
Resolution and rules and self-imposed
price level targets may be whistling in
the dark. Suppose no clarification of a
basic policy objective or intent is forth-
coming. Are there ways in which clues
about the evolution of policy could be
made more certain?
Open market operations inevitably in-
volve some mystery about whether an
operation is simply a defensive adjust-
ment of nonborrowed reserves that will
maintain the level of the federal funds
rate, or is an offensive intervention that
will change the level of the funds rate.
Memories of Thanksgiving 1989, when
financial markets misinterpreted open-
market action to add reserves prior to
the holiday as an easing step, lead to
questions about whether the FOMC
should provide additional information
in order to clarify the funds-rate implica-
tions of policy. If it is better for the mar-
ket to be more certain about the immedi-
ate policy objective, perhaps we could
provide additional information that
would allow Fedwatchers to replicate re-
serve management decisions at the trad-
ing desk more accurately.
I am not sure that there is a good way to
provide that additional information. In-
evitably, reserve management involves
a healthy dose of judgment—of art, if
you will. Even if we were to open the
books of the Fed on a daily or hourly
basis, judgment about the market fac-
tors and other uncertainties that the trad-
ing desk inevitably must confront would
still be required. Some uncertainty about
the intention of policy would remain.A simpler way to reduce uncertainty
might be for the Federal Reserve to
treat the federal funds rate just as it does
the discount rate. When the funds rate
objective changes, the Fed could issue a
press release explaining why. Or, per-
haps the whole approach to policy im-
plementation through open market oper-
ations should be scrapped. The open
market desk could simply announce
that it stands ready to do repurchase
agreements at one price and matched
sales at another.
Providing further information about pol-
icy actions will help markets operate
more efficiently, but except for those
unusual times such as last Thanksgiv-
ing, the improvements may not be very
large and may risk diverting attention
from the fundamental information prob-
lem. More information about reserve re-
straint will not provide more informa-
tion about the goal of monetary policy.
Ideal policy and efficient markets need
that information, and to produce it,
changes in the current policy process
are needed.
• Conclusion
The ultimate goal of monetary policy
must be to provide the credible and pre-
dictable commitment to price stability
required for peak performance of our
market economy. Achieving this ideal
at the least cost requires that policy-
makers provide markets with certain
basic information that will minimize
uncertainty about the commitment and
about the time frame within which it is
to be accomplished.
This emphasis is in marked contrast to
conventional concerns for more cer-
tainty about the current degree of re-
serve restraint. There are many ways we
could reduce uncertainty about the
immediate funds rate implications of
policy, just as there are many time
schedules by which we might release
the FOMC directive. Being more cer-
tain of the immediate federal funds rate
implications of policy might make
Fedwatching a bit easier, but would not
do much to help identify policy inten-
tions beyond the shortest of policy hori-
zons. Releasing the directive early
might provide a slightly brighter glim-
mer of policy intentions, but only for a
slightly longer policy horizon. What is
needed is not better information about
items in the directive, but better infor-
mation about the policy goal for the
long run.
More information about policy inten-
tions is where I see the greatest payoff.
An explicit FOMC commitment to
price stability would allow markets to
shift resources from watching the Fed-
eral Reserve to watching the economy
for productive investment opportunities.
• Footnotes
1. The Federal Open Market Committee,
the Federal Reserve's policymaking arm,
comprises the seven members of the Board
of Governors, the president of the Federal Re-
serve Bank of New York, and a rotating
group of four of the other 11 Reserve Bank
presidents.
2. See "The Case for Price Stability," Eco-
nomic Commentary, Federal Reserve Bank
of Cleveland, March 15, 1990; and "Break-
ing the Inflation-Recession Cycle," Eco-
nomic Commentary, Federal Reserve Bank
of Cleveland, October 15, 1989.
3. Policy actions might also include dis-
count rate and reserve requirement changes,
but comments here refer exclusively to
changes in open market operations.
4. The federal funds rate represents the in-
terest rate that banks and other depository in-
stitutions charge for surplus reserves that
they lend to one another.
5. For a brief discussion of these legislative
acts, see the Federal Reserve Bank of
Cleveland's 1989 Annual Report essay, p. 7.
6. For a definition of the composition of the
monetary and debt aggregates, see the Fed-
eral Reserve Bulletin, table 1.10.
W. Lee Hoskins is president of the Federal
Reseire Bank of Cleveland. The material in
this Economic Commentary is based on a
speech presented to the Money Marketeers in
New York City on March 1, 1990.
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